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1. INTRODUCTION
Cellular networks are notoriously difficult to design and oper-
ate; in particular, defining the optimal location of the base stations
and fine tuning their configuration parameters is very challenging.
For this reason, government agencies (such as the FCC for the US)
usually sell or rent, for example by auction, each operator a fre-
quency band for its exclusive usage in a given country or region.
Only a small part of the whole spectrum is allocated as a shared
spectrum, in which networks function in the same (unlicensed) fre-
quency band.
With the progress of technology and the fast growing demand
for ubiquitous high speed wireless services, it is clear that the pres-
sure towards more flexibility of the usage of the spectrum will only
increase. Therefore, the government agencies are likely to adapt
the current regulations in order to increase the proportion of the
unlicensed spectrum [1, 2].
The evolution towards unlicensed frequency bands can lead to
a better usage of the spectrum. Yet, it would also create a novel
situation, in which the base stations of different operators would
interfere with each other. An operator may be tempted to let its
base stations transmit at the maximum authorized level. But by
doing this, it would maximize interference not only to its own base
stations, but also to the base stations of the other operators, and to
all mobiles in power range; in addition, it faces the danger that the
other operators retaliate by behaving in the same way.
In our work, we assume that mobile users can freely roam across
the base stations located in their neighborhood, attaching to the
one offering the most favorable signal quality (i.e., the one with
the strongest pilot signal), irrespectively of the operator to which
the base station belongs. From the interference perspective, this
scenario could be much more efficient than the current practice,
because it enabled mobile devices to find the “closest” base station
in the area and hence both mobile devices and base stations could
significantly decrease their transmission power.
To mitigate interference, the shared frequency band is usually
split up into channels (i.e., separated frequency sub-bands), but the
pilot signal is typically emitted on a single shared channel for all
the base stations, which results in mutual interference of the pilot
signals (in CDMA networks, the interference of the pilot signals is
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referred to as the pilot pollution [4]).
In our scenario, we also assume that the operators want to cover
the largest possible area by increasing the transmission range of
their base stations. At the same time, they want to minimize the
interference. We assume that this goal corresponds to their motiva-
tion for maximizing the number of users who attach to their base
stations. We model this situation as a game in terms of power con-
trol of the base stations.
Recently, the coexistence of wireless operators in a non-shared
spectrum was addressed in two contributions. Halldo´rsson et al.
[3] study channel assignment strategies for Wi-Fi operators. They
use the maximum graph coloring problem to identify Nash equilib-
ria and they also provide a bound on the price of anarchy of these
equilibria. Zemlianov and de Veciana [6] consider the scenario, in
which users are able to choose between a cellular network and a
Wi-Fi network. They show that congestion sensitive strategies are
better than proximity-based strategies. None of these works con-
siders the power control of the base stations.
The remainder is organized in the following way. In Section 2,
we describe the system model and the corresponding power control
game. We summarize our results in Section 3. Finally, we conclude
in Section 4.
2. MODEL
In our work, we assume a wireless communication network with
two operators A and B and several users. Base stations and user
devices operate on the same unlicensed band of the frequency spec-
trum. We denote the set of base stations that belong to player
i ∈ {A,B} by Bi. Base station transmit pilot signals to notify
users about their presence. We assume that the expected position
of users is uniformly distributed over a given area and they attach
to the base station with the strongest received pilot signal. Hence
the goal of the operators is the maximize the area, in which their
pilot signal is the strongest. We apply a radio range model that
is widely used in the literature (for example the service coverage
defined in [5]), meaning that we model the coverage of the base
stations without interference with a circle. To further specify our
model, we assume that: (i) Operators want to provide wireless ac-
cess service everywhere. Thus, no place remains uncovered in the
area. (ii) There exists a limitation RMAX defined by the regulator
of the wireless telecommunication system. Furthermore, we de-
note the smallest common radio range which enables the base sta-
tions to cover the whole are by RMIN = maxk Rk,MIN , where
k ∈ {BA,BB}. Figure 1 shows an example for the coverage of a
base station.
We model the power control problem with two operators as a
two-player, nonzero-sum game. The strategy of the players defines
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Figure 1: Ranges in a general topology of base stations. RMAX
is defined by the regulator and Rk,MIN is the smallest range
with which they can cover the whole space around base sta-
tion bk. RMIN is the largest of these minimum ranges Rk,MIN
(meaning that it is the smallest common radio range which en-
ables full coverage).
area they cover with their pilot signal while minimizing the interfer-
ence in the network. This goal is expressed in their utility function.
We define the utility of player i as a function of the coverage area





(1 + γi) ·Ok − γi · r2k · pi (1)
where γi is the sensitivity of player i to interference, Ok is the
coverage area and rk is the radio range of base station bk ∈ Bi.
3. RESULTS
We first present a simplified scenario and derive the principles
of cooperation in it. Then we extend our study to more complex
scenarios.
To prove stability points in the power control game, we rely on
the following game-theoretic concepts.
DEFINITION 1. In a Nash equilibrium, none of the players can
unilaterally change its strategy to increase its utility.
Furthermore, if several Nash-equilibria exist, the concept of Pareto-
optimality is used to chose the best one.
DEFINITION 2. A set of strategies is Pareto-optimal (or socially
optimal), if none of the players can increase its utility unless the
utility of another player decreases.
Note that a Pareto-optimal set of strategies does not necessarily
constitute a Nash-equilibrium.
Consider the following simple scenario called the grid scenario.
Assume that the base stations are placed alternately on the vertices
of a grid and the radio ranges can be set only once (the latter as-
sumption defines a single-stage game). Let us also assume that the
players choose the same radio range for all of their base stations
(an example is shown in Figure 2). In this scenario, several Nash-
equilibria exist depending on the sensitivity values of the players.
We state the best Nash-equilibria in the following theorem.
THEOREM 1. Depending on the sensitivity values γi, three Pareto-
optimal Nash-equilibria exist in the grid scenario: (i) both players
play the radio range RMAX or (ii) RMIN or (iii) one player plays
the radio range equal to zero (its utility is maximized by not play-
ing), while the other covers the whole area.
If the players can set different radio ranges for their base stations
then we prove the following theorem.
THEOREM 2. Finding Nash equilibria in the power control game
for general values of radio ranges is NP-complete.
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Figure 2: Coverage areas of a base stations on the grid, illus-
trated with two base stations.
Assuming there is a general topology of base station within the
network of a player using a common radio range, we show that
cooperation (playing RMIN ) can be enforced using punishments.
THEOREM 3. If both players play a strategy based on punish-
ments then it results in a Nash equilibrium.
We emphasize that Theorem 1 applies only for the grid scenario
with two players, Theorems 2 and 3 apply for a general scenario
with arbitrary number of players.
4. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated the problem of co-existing
wireless operators in a shared spectrum. We have assumed that the
operators apply power control of the pilot signal at the base stations
to mitigate interference, while providing a permanent service to the
users.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we have shown
that Nash equilibria exist if the operators set the power of their base
stations at the beginning of the operation of the network. We have
identified different equilibrium situations depending on the sensi-
tivity of the operators to interference. Second, we have shown that
the solution of the power control problem is NP-complete for a
general topology of base stations and a general set of radio ranges.
Third, we have proved a condition for which a socially optimal
Nash equilibrium exists and that it can be enforced using punish-
ments. This result holds in the general topology of base stations
with specific radio ranges. In general, our results show which oper-
ation points are beneficial for the players and how these should be
achieved.
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